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a b s t r a c t 
Vine-growing in the Less-Favoured Areas of Greece is facing multiple challenges that might lead to its abandonment. In an 
attempt to maintain rural populations, Rural Development Schemes have been created that offer the opportunity to rural 
households to maintain or expand their farming businesses including vine-growing. This paper stems from a study that 
used data from a cross-sectional survey of 204 farmers to investigate how farming systems and farmers’ perception of 
corruption, amongst other socio-economic factors, affected their decisions to continue vine-growing through participation in 
Rural Development Schemes, in three remote Less-Favoured Areas of Greece. The Theory of Planned Behaviour was used to 
frame the research problem with the assumption being that an individual’s intention to participate in a Scheme is based on 
their prior beliefs about it. Data from the survey were reduced and simpliﬁed by the use of non-linear principal component 
analysis. The ensuing variables were used in selectivity corrected ordered probit models to reveal farmers’ attitudes towards 
viticulture and rural development. It was found that economic factors, perceived corruption and farmers’ attitudes were 
signiﬁcant determinants on whether to participate in the Schemes. The research ﬁndings highlight the important role of 
perceived corruption and the need for policies that facilitate farmers’ access to decision making centres. 
1. Introduction 
 
In Greece, 83% of agricultural land is in Less-Favoured Areas (LFA) where 29% of the population lives. 
Agriculture in LFA is the main activity consisting of extensive systems of olive and vine growing (Hellenic 
Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food, 2007). 
Viticulture has contributed to the cultural and economic life of these areas creating landscapes of great 
aesthetic value. However, during the last 15 years, viticulture is being abandoned, as farmers take up 
other employment. The consequences of abandonment include a reduction of grape supply to the wine-
making industry and important impacts on the social and economic structures of the LFA. Amongst the 
main threats to viticulture land use in LFA are low productivity and tourism infrastructure (Tzanopoulos et 
al., 2011; Kizos et al., 2009) along with low grape prices, high labour demands and seasonality of 
employment demand (Papadopoulos and Papanikos, 2005). 
However, in recent years, traditional vine-growing has gained importance again as a change in lifestyle of 
the urban population has created a revived demand for traditional landscapes and ways of life (Fleskens et al., 
2009). Also, as a result of the global economic crisis, Greek households are facing economic challenges, 
leading residents of LFA to return to farming and vine-growing (Kassimis and Papadopoulos, 2013). 
In an attempt to maintain the rural population, the EU’s Rural Development Policy was designed to 
provide opportunities to farmers in LFA. These opportunities include the promotion of multifunctional 
activities. The EU Rural Development Policy was implemented in Greece by the Rural Development 
Program for Greece, 2007–2013. Three schemes were included in this program for the vine-growing 
sector: an investment aid scheme that compensates up to 80% of an investment made to improve farm 
infrastructure; a subsidy for the adoption of organic practices compensating growers for income losses 
from being organic; and a subsidy scheme for investment in agro-tourist activities, paying up to 80% of  
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investment made on non-farming activities on farm. These schemes were on a voluntary basis and subject 
to the rules of eligibility of the Rural Development Programme for Greece. These measures were seen as 
crucial for the sector, but the adoption rate has not been as high as expected by policy makers 
(Karanikolas and Martinos, 2007). An investigation into the ﬁrst two of these schemes is reported here. 
Previous studies on the Greek agricultural sector have revealed that one of the country’s major 
problems is associated with institutional structure including corruption. Speciﬁcally for agriculture, in any 
transaction with the authorities, farmers’ ability to approach and inﬂuence the institutional system could be 
difﬁcult due to institutional corruption. Institutional corruption in Greece is a complex social issue, 
which is led by ﬁnancial motives and pro- cessed through social interactions between farmers and 
authorities and the interference of agencies and informal political networks (Louloudis et al., 2000; 
Vounouki, 2004; Karanikolas and Martinos, 2007; Barrio and Vounouki, 2003). Implementation of 
agricultural policies is perceived by the public as subject to corruption and political interests and 
dependent on fragmented, clientelist and uneven social protection which is often facilitated by the 
complicated legislative framework (Kourliouros et al., 2006; Karanikolas and Hatzipanteli, 2010; 
Monastiriotis and Antoniades, 2009). 
The economic recession caused by the ongoing Greek Government’s debt crisis has had great ﬁnancial 
and social consequences at both the individual and sectorial levels, including the agricultural and rural 
sector. The resultant austerity measures have led to reduced farm incomes and product prices and 
reduced access to credit. The budget for funding rural development has also been reduced and farmers are 
less willing to take investment risks (Hellenic Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food, 2012). 
The success of multifunctional agricultural schemes depends on farmers participating in them. Most 
research on farmers’ willingness to participate in multifunctional schemes in Europe has focused on agri-
environmental schemes. Four different approaches emerge from such literature: the ﬁnancial approach 
where farmers’ decisions are based on proﬁt maximization (Sintori et al., 2009; Genious et al., 2006; 
Bougherara and Latruffe, 2010); the spatial approach that examines farmers’ intentions from a 
geographical view (Wilson, 2009; Lange et al., 2013); the social demographic approach where decision 
making is based on demographic and structural characteristics of the farms and on the nature of the 
measure to be adopted (Tore, 2003; Mathijs, 2003; Broch et al., 2012; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002); and 
the behavioural approach that investigates farmers’ behaviour, views and attitudes on key aspects 
associated with agri-environmental schemes (Blackstock et al., 2010; Burton et al., 2008; Rehman et al., 
2007; Emery and Franks, 2012; Ingram et al., 2013). Some previous behavioural studies have also 
combined psychological aspects and farm characteristics when investigating farmers’ decision making at 
the individual level (Mattison and Norris, 2007; Läpple and Kelley, 2013; Gorton et al., 2008; de Lauwere 
et al., 2011; Areal et al., 2012; Hansson et al., 2012; de Graaff et al., 2010). 
In Greece, Papadopoulos and Papanikos (2005) examined the labour allocation preferences of vine-
growing households on a Greek island and Oxouzi (2008) investigated the adoption of organic viticulture in 
Central Macedonia with the focus being on economic and demographic factors, and not on farmer’s 
attitudes and behaviours. 
Here, we use an integrated approach that combines socio-economic, geographical, agricultural and 
psychological aspects to investigate farmers’ intention to participate in two multifunctional schemes, an 
investment aid scheme and a subsidy scheme for the adoption of organic practices, as well as a set of 
potential drivers behind farmers’ intention. We incorporate three novel aspects, farmers’ perception of 
institutional corruption, farmers’ perception of economic recession, and farming systems into our 
analysis of intention to participate in the schemes. Perception of corruption is a factor that has not been 
incorporated before in behavioural studies of farmers. Similarly, perception of the ongoing economic 
recession is used here for the ﬁrst time. Although farm structural characteristics are often incorporated 
in this type of analysis, we focused on identifying speciﬁc vine-growing systems to both examine their 
inﬂuence on farmers’ willingness to participate in agricultural schemes and use them as control 
variables. Farming systems within LFA are quite diverse and depend on factors such as tradition, 
terrain and resources available and the purpose of the vineyard. We classiﬁed farms based on their 
 
characteristics, purposes, structure, intensity and farm household characteristics. Our analysis enables 
us to discuss policy tools that could increase vine-growers’ participation in these schemes making them 
more efﬁcient. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, the methodology used is explained, including a description of 
the data collection method and an explanation of the econometric analysis of farmers’ willingness to 
participate in the two schemes. Then, the results of the analyses are presented and discussed. Finally, 
some conclusions are made. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Conceptual framework 
 
We use the framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), developed by Ajzen (1991) to help 
explain human behaviour as a “starting point” to frame the problem. Thus, an individual’s intention to 
participate in a scheme is based on the farmer’s prior beliefs about the scheme. An individual’s overall 
belief com- prise behavioural, normative and control beliefs. In this context: behavioural beliefs are an 
individual’s personal beliefs about the consequences of participating in the agricultural scheme; normative 
beliefs are an individual’s perception of social pressure to participate or not in the scheme; whereas control 
beliefs refer to the individual’s perceived ease or difﬁculty of participating in the scheme. A number of 
statements on potential farmers’ views about the scheme were evaluated by farmers and grouped into a 
number of components using non-linear PCA. This enabled us to use these new constructs in the analysis of 
farmers’ intention to participate in the schemes. 
Since we were interested in investigating how speciﬁc factors, such as farmers’ perception of 
institutional corruption, farmers’ perception of the economic crisis as well as farmers’ views about the 
future and local characteristics of the environment in which the farm is located (i.e. the agricultural 
system of the farm) may affect farmers’ intention to participate in the schemes, we incorporated them 
along with socio-demographic aspects and farmers’ experience of participating in similar schemes into 
our conceptual framework (Fig. 1). 
 
2.2. Survey 
 
Three Greek areas with substantial vine-growing activity were selected for study: the mountain area of 
Ioannina; the island of Samos; and the coastal area of Kavala. They represent three types of LFA in Greece 
– mountains, islands and areas with special handicaps, as designated in EU Regulation (EC) 1698/2005. 
The survey of vine-growers took place between July and September 2012. A total of 204, randomly 
chosen, vine-growers participated. The survey used an anonymous questionnaire. The questionnaire 
design was partially based on information obtained from a series of in-depth interviews with 18 farmers 
and an agronomist that took place prior to the survey. 
The questionnaire was divided into three sections. First, questions on demographic and farm 
characteristics aimed at collecting information for the identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of vine-growing 
systems. The second section collected information on farmers’ intention to continue vine-growing and 
to participate in the two schemes or not. In the third section, participants were asked to evaluate on a 5-
step scale a number of statements designed to reveal their perception of the schemes and their attitudes 
towards them. More speciﬁcally, farmers evaluated:  
 
1) views and attitudes towards vine-growing and the two schemes; 
2) perception of corruption in the vine-growing sector; and 
3) perception of the impact of the economic recession on their farming activities. 
 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Conceptual framework. 
 
 
 
The statements on farmers’ views and attitudes were based on information derived from the qualitative 
analysis of the interviews and were designed to capture the three dimensions in the TPB (personal beliefs, 
subjective norms and perceived behavioural control). Speciﬁc statements were made for each agricultural 
scheme based on the information obtained from the in-depth interviews. 
Thus,   for the investment aid scheme, participants had to evaluate 17 statements regarding personal 
beliefs, 5 statements regarding subjective norms and 8 statements regarding perceived behavioural control. 
For the organic vine-growing scheme, participants had to evaluate 14 statements on personal beliefs, 5 
statements on subjective norms and 8 statements on perceived behavioural control. The statements used for 
both schemes and their relation to each of the TPB factors are presented in Appendix A Tables A.1 and A.2. 
 
2.3. Statistical analysis 
 
Information from the survey was simpliﬁed using non-linear principal component analysis (PCA), a 
data reduction methodology that functions in the same way as factor analysis, but can incorporate 
categorical variables by transforming them into numeric ones (Linting et al., 2007). The outcome of a non-
linear PCA, is a reduced number of variables (or principal components) that are correlated with the 
original dataset but uncorrelated to each other. The main difference between traditional PCA and non-
linear PCA is that the results of the latter are not nested, meaning that the eigen-values change as the 
number of components in the analysis change (Linting et al., 2007). Therefore, the criterion followed to 
select the number of components was the Cronbach’s alpha coefﬁcient criterion which measures the 
degree to which a set of observations measure a component and can be used to describe the reliability 
of factors extracted (Manisera et al., 2010; Gliem and Gliem, 2003). A threshold of coefﬁcient value 
being 0.5 was chosen. The components that had a Cronbach’s a >0.5, also had an eigen-value greater than 
2. The eigen-value > 2 was used as an extension of the Kaiser (1958) criterion for selecting underlying 
components to conﬁrm the validity of the choice of number of components (Jongeneel et al., 2008). 
Three non-linear PCA were conducted on: the variables describing the vine-growing systems; the 
evaluation of behavioural statements reﬂecting farmers’ views and attitudes towards the investment aid 
scheme; and the evaluation of behavioural statements reﬂecting farmers’ views and attitudes toward the 
organic vine-growing scheme.
Table 1 
Description of farm types based on the results of non-linear PCA.  
Farm type Description 
Island vineyards Traditional vineyards on terraces dependent on 
co-operatives combined with olive trees, existing  
because of tradition. Minimum mechanization, no  
irrigation and low cup formation system. Island areas 
Mountain vineyards Hill-side farms combined with livestock, full-time 
farming, existing because of lack of employment  
opportunities. Mechanized. Mountain areas 
Coastal vineyards Intensive commercial farms of table grapes dependent 
on contractors, combined with perennial crops,  
existing for income generation. Highly mechanized,  
irrigated, and sustained table grape formation system.  
Coastal areas 
Part-time vineyards Intensive mechanized vineyards dependent on 
wineries, part-time farming, double linear formations  
system. All areas 
Estate vineyards Large fragmented vineyards, part of wine-making 
estates. Lifestyle as reason for existence. Mountains  
and coasts 
Hobby vineyards Household vineyards combined with other household 
farming activities. No deﬁned purpose or reason for  
existence. All areas 
 
  
For identiﬁcation of vine-growing systems a non-linear PCA was performed on variables related to 
vineyard and farm management characteristics, derived from the ﬁrst section of the questionnaire. This 
enabled the identiﬁcation of 6 vine-growing systems (Table 1). (The results of the PCA and the factor 
loadings are presented in Appendix B Table B.1.) The non-linear PCA performed on behavioural 
statements related to participating in the investment aid scheme yielded three factors: ﬁnancial; idealism; 
and perceived behavioural control (Table 2). The non-linear PCA performed on farmers’ views and 
attitudes towards the organic vine-growing subsidy scheme also produced three factors (Table 3). The 
results of the PCA were used as numerical variables in the estimation models. For ease of interpretation, 
they were normalized on a scale from 0 to 10 (Areal et al., 2012). 
As shown in Table 2, the ﬁrst factor (Financial_imp) reﬂects personal attitudes to economic issues and 
describes farmers that are interested in the ﬁnancial aspect of receiving a subsidy for investing in their 
vineyards. It also includes statements relating to peer pressure for having a good vineyard to the 
perceived social views on receiving a subsidy. The second factor (Idealists_imp) is about personal 
attitudes relating to the value of the environment and landscape and to the development of viticulture 
and it describes farmers that are more interested in the importance of their vine- yards for issues other 
than proﬁt making. It includes one statement relating to social interaction. The third factor (Control imp) 
relates to perceived behavioural control and describes farmers that ﬁnd it easy to apply for a subsidy, 
collaborate with the authorities and understand the relevant procedures. 
As shown in Table 3, the ﬁrst factor (Financial_org), again, describes economic related personal 
attitudes and describes farmers that are concerned with the proﬁt–cost relationship emerging from 
receiving a subsidy for being organic. It, too, also includes the statements relating to social pressure for 
having a good vineyard and to the social views on receiving a subsidy. The second factor 
(Idealists_org) describes farmers that are interested in the importance of organic farming on non-proﬁt 
aspects like environ- mental protection and the development of viticulture and the area and also have 
interests outside farming. This factor includes statements on social norm that describe the interaction of 
farmers with each other and society. Similarly to the previous scheme, the third factor (Control_org) 
relates to perceived behavioural control and describes farmers that have no difﬁculties collaborating 
with the authorities and applying for a subsidy. 
The incorporation of the results of the non-linear PCA analyses results in the conceptual framework of 
the study being adapted as presented in Fig. 2. 
A variable on perception of corruption was generated by asking participants to evaluate, on a 5-step 
Likert scale, the level of corruption in the bureaucratic procedures for each scheme (with 1 = very low and 5 
= very high). Farmers perceiving high/low levels of corruption within the bureaucratic procedures were 
expected to have a negative/positive effect on willingness to participate in the schemes. 
Two additional variables accounting for farmers’ perception of the economic recession were also 
included. The ﬁrst described farmers’ perception of the impact of the recession on their activities and 
they were asked to evaluate the impact of the recession on the viticulture sector. The second was 
associated with the belief that the situation of the vine-growing sector will improve in the future and 
was generated by asking the farmers their agreement or not to this statement. We expected that farmers 
who were optimistic about the future would be more willing to participate in either of the study schemes 
than would those who were pessimistic.  
A dummy variable on previous participation in each study scheme was also included as it was expected 
that vine-growers who had experience in participating in schemes would be more likely to participate 
again than vine-growers without such experience.  Finally, farmers’ education level and age were used as 
demographic variables. 
 
2.4. Estimation 
 
Examination of factors inﬂuencing farmers’ willingness to participate in the schemes studied was 
based on Random Utility Theory, i.e. vine-growers would choose to participate in a scheme if this  
 
 Behavioural factors related to the Investment Aid Scheme. 
Factor   Component loadings   
Financial imp There are delays in payments of the investment aid ATTa 0.659  
 Others expect me to have the best vineyard NORMa 0.650  
 People think that I should not receive subsidies It is important to receive a subsidy 
NORM 
ATT −0.638 0.619  
 It is proﬁtable to modernize the vine-growing system ATT 0.523  
 Vineyard improvement helps reduce production costs ATT 0.457  
 People consider farmers to be socially lower 
It is important to maintain my vineyard 
NORM 
ATT −0.592 0.376  
Idealists imp Improving the vineyard improves product quality ATT  0.872 
 It is important to protect the environment ATT  0.833 
 It is important to maintain landscape ATT  0.791 
 Rural landscapes have aesthetic value ATT  0.790 
 Cost of investment for vine-yard improvement is high ATT  0.761 
 It is important to expand my business ATT  0.693 
 My relation with the other farmers is good NORM  0.649 
 Subsidies are useful to farmers ATT  0.544 
 My vineyard is not eligible for improvement ATT  0.506 
 Subsidies help viticulture develop ATT  0.455 
 Subsidies are useful to area ATT  0.444 
 It is useful to improve my vineyard ATT  0.352 
Control imp It is easy to have the necessary connections to receive a subsidy CONT   0.717 
 It is easy to apply for the Investment Aid Scheme CONTa   0.659 
 Subsidies involve long procedures It is easy to collaborate with authorities 
CONT 
CONT   −0.655 0.625 
 It is easy to improve my vineyard CONT   0.623 
 It is important to expand vineyard ATT   0.586 
 It is easy to understand the law CONT   0.581 
 My subsidies are subject to other people’s decisions 
There is a lot of red tape in RD scheme participation 
NORM 
CONT   
−0.553 
−0.507 
a ATT = attitude, NORM = subjective norm, CONT = perceived behavioural control. 
 
Table 3 
Behavioural factors related to the organic vine-growing scheme. 
Factor   Component loadings   
Financial org Organic farming lowers yield ATTa 0.809  
 Organic farming lowers quality standards ATT 0.777  
 Organic Farming Schemes has strict rules ATT 0.707  
 Others expect me to have the best vineyard NORMa 0.579  
 Organic products have higher prices ATT 0.555  
 People think that I should not receive subsidies 
It is important to receive a subsidy 
NORM 
ATT −0.549 0.516  
 Supplies for organic farming are costly ATT 0.447  
 It is useful to be organic ATT −0.376  
Idealists org Organic products have better quality ATT  0.728 
 Subsidies are useful to farmers ATT  0.671 
 My relation with the other farmers is good NORM  0.654 
 I am interested in environmental protection ATT  0.647 
 People consider farmers to be socially lower 
Subsidies help viticulture develop 
NORM 
ATT  −0.579 0.568 
 Subsidies are useful to area ATT  0.565 
 It is important to have interests outside farming ATT  0.491 
 It is easy to stay in the area CONTa  0.405 
Control org It is easy to apply for the Organic Farming Scheme CONT   0.740 
 Easy to have the necessary connections to receive a subsidy CONT   0.722 
 Subsidies involve long procedures 
My subsidies are subject to other people’s decisions 
It is easy to collaborate with authorities 
CONT 
NORM 
CONT 
  −0.687 
−0.661 
0.642 
 It is easy to understand the law CONT   0.592 
 It is important to secure my income CONT   0.491 
 There is a lot of red tape in RD scheme participation 
It is easy to be organic 
CONT 
CONT   −0.417 0.383 
a ATT = attitude, NORM = subjective norm, CONT = perceived behavioural control. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Incorporation of variables in the study conceptual framework. 
 
choice maximized their utility. Utility can be expressed as a latent variable yi*: y i* = x'i β+ei,i =1, 2. …N
 (1) where i is the number of each observation; x' i is the vector of the factors inﬂuencing y i*; β is a 
vector of coefﬁcients to be estimated; and ei is disturbances that are unobserved with ei ∼ N[0,1] 
(Greene, 2004). However, according to Greene and Hensher (2010), adoption of an innovation is not a 
completely random process as farmers self-select themselves into treatment. Therefore, before examining 
their willingness to participate in a scheme, participants were ﬁrst selected according to their willingness to 
continue vine-growing and only likely continuers were assessed for their willingness to participate in the 
schemes. In order to account for this, a selection utility equation was added to the model of Eq. (1), so that 
it takes the following form: 
 
 
 
 
where eij are the normally distributed error terms, β1 is a vector of parameters to be estimated in the 
model of the ﬁrst equation, β2 is a vector of parameters to be estimated in the model of the second 
equation, with  
E[ei1|xi1,xi2]=E[ei2|xi1xi2]=0,Var[ei1|xi1,xi2]=Var[ei2|xi1xi2]=1 and Cov[ei1ei2|xi1,xi2]= p. 
For this model the conditional probability is: 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the fact that intentions of vine growers to continue has a binary response (yes or no)1 and the 
willingness of a vine-grower 
    
1 More details on the variables and the results of the sample selection model can be found in the Appendix.2 All explanatory variables 
used in all models were checked for statistical signiﬁcance through x
2 tests for discrete variables and a one sample t- test for continuous 
ones. Also, to account for multicollinearity, correlation matrices for all explanatory variables and V.I.F. indexes of all variables were 
checked. 
 i2 ≤ ≤ 
Descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimation models. 
Variable Description Mean Std. dev. 
Variables common for both modes 
Island vineyards 
 
PCA result (scale 1–10) 
 
5.464 
 
2.007 
Mountain vineyards PCA result (scale 1–10) 3.929 1.922 
Coastal vineyards PCA result (scale 1–10) 2.561 1.897 
Part-time vineyards PCA result (scale 1–10) 3.458 1.841 
Estate vineyards PCA result (scale 1–10) 2.433 1.720 
Hobby vineyards PCA result (scale 1–10) 3.957 1.967 
Age Age in years 49.09 13.764 
Education Dummy (1 = college or university, 0 = otherwise) 0.37 0.485 
S future Dummy (1 = positive, 0 = negative) 0.36 0.482 
Recession Dummy (1 = negative, 0 = positive) 0.84 0.369 
 
Variables used in the ordered probit on willingness to participate in the investment aid Scheme 
Corruption Dummy (1 = farmers believes there is corruption, 0 = otherwise) 0.480 0.501 
Previous participation imp Dummy (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.340 0.474 
Financial imp PCA result (scale 1–10) 7.472 1.620 
Idealists imp PCA result (scale 1–10) 4.740 2.683 
Control imp PCA result (scale 1–10) 4.418 2.145 
 
Variables used in the ordered probit on willingness to participate in the organic farming scheme 
Previous participation org Dummy (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.16 0.365 
Corruption1 Dummy (1 = farmers believes there is corruption, 0 = otherwise) 0.38 0.486 
Financial org PCA result (scale 1–10) 4.611 1.976 
Idealists org PCA result (scale 1–10) 6.793 1.942 
Control org PCA result (scale 1–10) 4.493 1.810 
to participate in a scheme was rated on a 5-point Likert scale and, under the assumption that the error 
terms are normally distributed, we can say that a standard probit model dominates the ﬁrst equation and 
an ordered probit model dominates the second. 
A two-step conditional model was developed following Greene and Hensher (2010), where the 
observed outcomes yij are related to     as follows: 
 
where yi1 is the observed outcome of the selection model (i.e. stated willingness to continue vine-
growing by farmer i); yi2 is the observed outcome of the second model (i.e. stated intention to 
participate in the scheme by farmer i); and µj are unknown threshold parameters to be estimated with 0 
< µ1  < µ2  < · · · < µj. 
The primary aim of the analysis was to obtain consistent estimates of a vector of parameters β1 and 
β2, by using observations from the selected sample. Given that both parts of the structured model are 
non-linear, the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is considered the most adequate choice (Luca 
and Perotti, 2011). 
The two equations need to be estimated simultaneously in order to account for sample selection 
which, in practice, means that for a particular farmer i, yi2 is not observed unless yi1 = 1. In MLE, the 
covariance of the error terms of the two equations p is not directly estimated (Luca and Perotti, 2011), 
but the transformed correlation coefﬁcient   , based on Fisher’s z transformation is estimated instead: 
 
 
 
where, z is normally distributed, ln is the natural logarithm function and atanh is the inverse hyperbolic 
function (Fisher, 1915). This transformation is preferred as for sample correlation it has a near- 
constant variance for all values of p (Cox, 2008; Buis, 2011).  
The effect of the explanatory variable is measured in terms of marginal effect deﬁned as partial 
change in the probability of the outcome caused by a change in an explanatory variable ceteris paribus 
(marginal effects). 
In addition, a standard order probit model, with 5 outcomes, was estimated for each scheme and 
the results were compared to the selectivity-corrected models.
  
3. Results and discussion 
 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
The statistical analysis was performed using STATA 12 software. Table 4 shows the means of the 
variables used in the ordered probit models. Some variables were common for all models, while others 
were model speciﬁc. 
The mean of the normalized variables on a scale from 1 to 10 shows that, on average, the majority of 
the participants’ vineyards fall under the ‘island vineyards’ category. Also, for the investment aid scheme, 
the majority of farmers fall under the factor describing ﬁnancial concerns (Financial imp). However, for 
the organic vine- growing scheme, the majority of farmers belong to the category of idealists 
(Idealists_org). 
Regarding corruption, farmers’ perceptions of its existence differs on average between the 
implementation of the two schemes, with 48% of the farmers believing it exists in the procedures for the 
investment aid scheme, whereas a smaller percentage (38%) thinks it is present in the implementation 
of the organic vine-growing scheme. Most participants (84%) found that the recession had had a 
negative impact on their vine-growing activities. 
Estimated willingness to participating in subsidy schemes rates are shown in Table 5. Overall, 
willingness to participate is higher for the investment aid scheme than for the scheme for organic 
practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Estimation results 
 
Two ordered probit models, one for vine-growers’ participation in the investment aid scheme and one 
for vine-growers’ participation in the organic farming scheme, were estimated. Each model was 
estimated with, and without, selectivity correction to identify any self-selection. (The variables used 
in the selection model and their descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix C, Tables C.1, C.2 and 
C.3. The estimated coefﬁcients of the selection model are shown in Appendix C, Table C.4). We only 
found self-selection to be the case for the investment aid scheme. In both models, robust standard 
errors were estimated to account for potential heteroskedasticity. To assess the ﬁt of the models, Wald 
statistic tests were carried out.
  
3.2.1. Investment aid scheme 
Table 6 shows the results of the models estimating vine- growers’ intention to participate in the 
investment aid scheme. The correlation coefﬁcient ˆp1 between the selection model and the ordered 
probit was statistically signiﬁcant meaning that selectivity correction was needed. Therefore, the 
model chosen for discussion is the selectivity corrected one. The selection equation eliminated 44 
observations, so the estimation of the probabilities was for the remaining 160 ones. Table 7 shows the 
marginal effects of the explanatory variables on each outcome of the model (marginal effects of the 
non-selectivity corrected model are shown in Appendix D Table D.1). As indicated in Tables 6 and 7, 
farmers’ intention to participate in the investment aid scheme is negatively inﬂuenced by their 
perception of corruption in the scheme’s bureaucratic procedures. Thus, a one unit increase in farmers’ 
perception of corruption on a 1–10 scale would lead to a 14% drop in their responding positively to 
participate in the scheme. Discussions with farmers led to the observation that corruption can be a 
serious issue when it comes to participating in the investment aid scheme and that the subsidy 
received from the scheme does not always compensate for the effort and the money needed to 
overcome corruption. Karanikolas and Martinos (2007) found that farmers believe there is an 
established relation of the scheme to clientelism with corruption being manifested in many stages of 
the participation procedure. Also, according to Sotiropoulos (2004), state centralization is associated with 
slow procedures and ambiguous legal frameworks which may increase farmers’ perception of 
corruption and restrict their participation in the scheme. 
Changes in farmers’ perception of the economic crisis have an impact on farmers’ willingness to 
participate in the investment aid scheme. More speciﬁcally, if farmers’ perception about the economic 
crisis impact is negative, the probability of the farmer being willing to participate in the scheme would be 
higher compared with those who do not perceive such an impact. The fact that a farm crisis can lead 
farmers to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the CAP to fund investment on their farms 
was also mentioned by Maye et al. (2009) who said that in times of crisis investing in diversiﬁcation 
“becomes more signiﬁcant as a business pathway” as it can offer farm businesses a “positive crisis-
recovery strategy”. Optimism for the future, as expected, was positively related with the probability of 
participating in the investment aid scheme as farmers who were more optimistic about the future were 
more likely to participate in the scheme that those who were less optimistic. 
The ﬁrst TPB (Financial_imp) factor is positively correlated to participation to the scheme. Results 
show that by increasing their evaluation of “Financial_imp” by 1 unit (e.g. from 6 to 7 in a 1–10 scale) 
the probability that the farmer answers “probably yes” or “deﬁnitely yes” to participate in the scheme 
 
Table 7 
Marginal effects of explanatory variables on the outcomes of the probit model estimating vine-growers’ intention to participate in the investment aid subsidy scheme with 
corrected sample selection. 
 
Variable Participating in the investment aid subsidy scheme 
 Deﬁnitely not Probably not Not sure Probably yes Deﬁnitely yes  
Financial imp −0.0495*** −0.0187*** −0.0110*** 0.0362*** 0.0429***  
Idealists imp −0.0116 −0.0044 −0.0026 0.0085 0.0101  Control imp −0.0454*** −0.0172*** −0.0101*** 0.0333*** 0.0394***  Recession −0.0634* −0.0240 −0.0141 0.0464* 0.0550  S future −0.0479** −0.0181* −0.0106 0.0351** 0.0416**  Corruption 0.0882*** 0.0334*** 0.0196*** −0.0646*** −0.0766***  imp −0.1112*** −0.0420*** −0.0247** 0.0814*** 0.0965***  Island vineyards −0.0072 −0.0027 −0.0016 0.0053 0.0062  Mountain vineyards −0.0077 −0.0029 −0.0017 0.0056 0.0067  Coastal vineyards −0.0095 −0.0036 −0.0021 0.0070 0.0082  Part-time vineyards 0.0104 0.0039 0.0023 −0.0076 −0.0090  Estate vineyards −0.0126 −0.0048 −0.0028 0.0092 0.0110  Hobby vineyards −0.0044 −0.0017 −0.0010 0.0032 0.0038  Previous participation imp 0.1112*** 0.0420*** 0.0247** 0.0814*** 0.0965***  Age −0.0012 0.0005 0.0003 −0.0009 −0.0010  
Educ −0.0301 −0.0114 −0.0067 0.0221 0.0262  
*   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.1 level of signiﬁcance. 
**   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05 level of signiﬁcance. 
***   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.01 level of signiﬁcance. 
  increases by 7.91%. This factor also relates to social norms and farmers’ social and occupational 
identities and the positive relation of these to participation in schemes agrees with the results of 
researchers like Dessein and Nevens (2007) and Burton et al. (2008). It has also been mentioned by 
Jongeneel et al. (2008) that there is a relationship between perceived farming social identity and 
participation in multifunctional schemes. 
The factor describing perceived behavioural control was significantly and positively correlated, 
meaning that farmers who ﬁnd it easy to acquire information, understand the law and collabo- rate 
with the authorities are more likely to participate (increase probabilities of positive outcomes by 
7.91%). Previously, in England, Elliott et al. (2003) had also found that farmers perceived the 
procedures of applying to be complicated and those who ﬁnd help, or think they did not need it, are 
more likely to apply for a subsidy. For the case of Greek farmers this result is also in accordance with 
other authors who have studied the relation of the investment aid to the ability to overcome the 
bureaucratic procedures and influence the authorities such as Papadopoulos (1997) and Karanikolas 
and Martinos (2007). 
Previous participation in the scheme was found to be statistically signiﬁcant and had a positive 
inﬂuence on increasing the probability of participating in the scheme. Farmers who previously 
participated in the scheme were 17.8% more likely to be willing to participate again than those with 
no previous experience of participating in the scheme. This ﬁnding is similar to the ﬁndings of 
others on farmers’ participation in Rural Development Schemes (e.g. Vanslembrouck et al., 2002). 
Regarding vine-growing systems, it was found that farmers with large areas of fragmented 
vineyards, or parts of wine-making estates, were keen on participating in the investment aid scheme. 
Only those with much larger vineyards were more likely to participate in the scheme, possibly due to 
their owners ﬁnding it easier to ﬁnancially support an improvement plan. Farmers with other vine-
growing systems were not found to be very interested in participating in the investment aid scheme. 
 
3.2.2. Organic farming scheme 
Table 8 shows the results of the ordered probit model that estimated vine-growers’ intention to 
participate in the organic subsidy scheme before and after the sample selection. Results of the 
selection model are shown in Appendix C Table C.4. The correlation coefﬁcientˆp2 between the 
ordered probit and selection model was not statistically signiﬁcant, meaning that correction was not 
necessary to extract reliable results. Therefore, the model chosen for discussion here is a standard 
ordered probit model (see ﬁrst column of Table 8). Table 9 shows the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on each outcome of the model. (Marginal effects of the selectively corrected 
model are presented in Appendix C Table C.1.) From the results shown in Tables 8 and 9, we can see that 
the second TPB factor describing the importance of issues such as environ- mental and landscape 
protection (Idealists org) was, as expected, signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with farmers’ 
intention to participate in organic vine-growing. This result is similar to that of Burton et al. (2003) 
who found that environmental awareness increased the possibility of farmers adopting agri-
environmental schemes. In particular, it was found that having a unit’s increase in the value of this 
factor increases the probability of a positive outcome (5 = deﬁnitely yes or 4 = probably yes) by 
2.84%. 
The factor describing perceived behavioural control (Control org) also has signiﬁcant and positive 
correlation, meaning that farmers who are positive about dealing with authorities, or farmers who think 
that they can overcome institutional obstacles, are more likely to participate in the scheme. More 
speciﬁcally, the probability that farmers are willing to participate in the scheme increases by 5.60% with 
a one unit increase in farmers’ perception of control. This result was expected, based on the original 
discussions with farmers, and generally agrees with Läpple (2010) and Hansson et al. (2012) who 
highlighted the inﬂuence of this kind of psychological factor on adoption of new measures.  
As far as vine-growing systems are concerned, three systems have statistically signiﬁcant 
coefﬁcients. Traditional terraced vine- yards on the islands with low mechanization rates were 
negatively correlated with participation in the organic vine-growing scheme. The probability of a 
positive outcome decreases when respondents tend to be part of that vine-growing system. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Marginal effects of explanatory variables on the outcomes of the probit model estimating vine-growers intention to participate in the subsidy scheme for organic farming. 
Variable Outcome  
 Deﬁnitely not Probably not Not sure Probably yes Deﬁnitely yes 
Financial org −0.0073 0.0003 0.0012 0.0022 0.0035 
Idealists org −0.0359*** 0.0016 0.0060** 0.0110*** 0.0174*** 
Control org −0.0710*** 0.0031 0.0119*** 0.0217*** 0.0343*** 
Recession −0.0716 0.0031 0.0120 0.0219 0.0346 
S future 
Corruption org −0.0050 0.0756 
0.0002 
−0.0033 
0.0008 
−0.0126 
0.0015 
−0.0231 
0.0024 
−0.0366 
Previous participation org −0.4199*** 0.0184 0.0701*** 0.1283*** 0.2031***  
Island vineyards 0.0301** −0.0013 −0.0050 −0.0092** −0.0146**  Mountain vineyards −0.0264* 0.0012 0.0044* 0.0081* 0.0128**  Coastal vineyards 0.0584 −0.0026 −0.0098*** −0.0178*** −0.0283***  Part-time vineyards −0.0092 0.0004 0.0015 0.0028 0.0044  Estate vineyards 0.0014 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0007  Hobby vineyards −0.0039 0.0002 0.0007 0.0012 0.0019  Age 0.0045*** −0.0002** −0.0008** −0.0014 −0.0022***  Education 0.0501 −0.0022 −0.0084 −0.0153 −0.0242  
*   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.1 level of signiﬁcance. 
**   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05 level of signiﬁcance. 
***   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.01 level of signiﬁcance. 
 
These ﬁndings concur with Papadopoulos and Papanikos (2005) who found that vine-growers on 
islands are not attracted to agri-environmental schemes. Modern, and proﬁt-oriented, vineyards with 
high rates of mechanization in coastal areas were negatively correlated with participation in organic 
vine-growing. This result is in line with Oxouzi (2008) who found that farmers with proﬁt-orientated 
vine- yards are less likely to adopt organic farming. In contrast, hill-side vineyards in mountain areas 
were positively associated with participation in the organic vine-growing scheme. Wine-making estates, 
part-time and hobby vineyards did not have statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients but this could be due to 
the nature of the scheme, as eligibility rules often exclude part-time farmers from receiving subsidies 
(Oxouzi, 2008). 
Previous participation in the scheme is an important factor in terms of inﬂuencing farmers’ 
intentions to participate in the organic scheme. The probability of farmers being willing to participate 
was 33% higher for farmers who participated in the scheme before, than those who were not in the 
scheme.
  
Perception of corruption was not found to be signiﬁcantly co-related to farmers’ intentions to 
participate in the organic vine-growing scheme. Similarly, their perception of the impact of the 
economic recession and optimism for the future were not signiﬁcantly co-related to the probability of 
participating in the scheme. Furthermore, after discussion with farmers, it was found that they believed 
that corruption does not have a signiﬁcant effect on entry to the organic scheme as there is relatively 
little money involved. In addition, many vine-growers that want to be organic can be so without 
participating in the scheme and, therefore, they are not intimidated by corruption. As far as the 
economic recession is concerned, organic farming does not involve large investment and is not as 
highly related to the proﬁtability of the vineyards as is the investment aid scheme. In addition, for 
those farmers that become organic for moral or ethical reasons, the current economic situation has little 
inﬂuence on their beliefs. 
Farmers’ age was found to be negatively related to their intention to participate in the organic vine 
growing scheme (p- value < 0.01) which is in accordance with other studies on adoption of organic 
farming (e.g. Anderson et al., 2005; Padel, 2008). 
Education level was found to not be associated with farmers’ participation in the organic vine-growing 
scheme whereas based on previous research (e.g. Damianos and Giannakopoulos, 2002; Oxouzi, 2008), it 
would be expected that the more educated farmers would be keener to adopt organic farming than others. 
However, it could be that, better educated farmers have a higher understanding of the constraints imposed 
by legislation and bureaucracy, and the associated difﬁculties of applying organic practices on farms, than 
the less educated ones. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we discuss the impact of several factors on Greek vine-growers’ decisions to participate in 
two voluntary RD schemes–namely the Investment Aid Scheme and the Organic Farming Scheme. 
These factors included perception of corruption, perception of the economic recession, farming 
systems and farmers’ attitudes and beliefs. 
Results indicated that perceived corruption in the implementation of the Rural Development Policy 
is an important negative driver for farmer participation especially for the Investment Aid Scheme. 
Also, psychological constraints play an important role in farmers’ participation intentions, especially 
those related to Perceived Behavioural Control (i.e. access and interaction with the authorities). 
Farmers’ perception of the current economic recession in Greece was found to be correlated positively 
with farmers’ willingness to participate in the schemes. Regarding farming systems, only large estate 
vineyards had the intention to participate in the Investment Aid Scheme while, for the Organic Scheme, 
some farm types were more inﬂuential than others. Finally, participation was motivated by ﬁnancially 
related factors and factors related to protection of the environment for the Investment Aid Scheme and 
the Organic Farming Scheme, respectively. 
These ﬁndings indicate that there is a need for a range of policy solutions that would enhance vine-
growers’ participation in RD schemes. Two main policy implications are derived from our analysis. 
First, that the strategies for RD scheme participation should include signiﬁcant changes in the way RD 
schemes are administered (i.e. its design and implementation). The second is that there is a need for 
ﬁnding ways to facilitate effective communication between RD stakeholders, mainly the farmers and 
the policy makers. Several policy options can be suggested to nudge farmers to participate in RD 
schemes. 
First, a large proportion of farmers perceive the government as corrupt. However, since the main 
way in which corruption is manifested is through the use of informal networking, farmers who believe 
that they have access to informal networks are more likely to participate in such schemes. Hence, 
there is a need for a ﬁscal framework that mitigates the factors providing grounds for corruption–such 
as complex legislation, red tape and state centralization–to reduce its negative perception by farmers. 
 For instance, the introduction of modern IT technologies, as well as ensuring anonymity in the initial 
stages of the application process for schemes, could help to reduce the perception of unfairness in the 
application process and the perceived need for networking. Additionally, a more controlled budget 
allocation combined with public information on its distribution amongst farmers and regions could build 
up trust in government. Also, assigning trained staff at the local administrative level could reduce 
farmers’ potential interactions with external networks and lessen the idea that submitting an 
application is problematic (Elliott et al., 2003). 
Second, contrary to policy makers’ beliefs on the linkage between reception and participation in 
schemes (Hellenic Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food, 2012), we found that farmers’ 
would be more keen to participate in RD schemes if they perceive effects of the economic recession 
on viticulture to be negative, especially for the Investment Aid Scheme. The ongoing economic crisis 
has had an impact on other industries, which may have led farmers to reconsider the possibility of 
staying in farming and taking advantage of schemes that can help ﬁnance their businesses. Facilitating 
access to credit and easing repayment requirements, especially by small scale farmers who may ﬁnd it 
more difﬁcult to acquire investment capital (Ministry of Rural Development and Food, 2012), may 
contribute to dealing with the ﬁnancial crisis. At the administrative level, ensuring faster payment of 
subsidies could boost cash ﬂow in the sector and reduce farmers’ risk perception. Furthermore, the 
creation and support of marketing channels, through national and local strategies and interventions 
that would enforce the circulation of farm products, could provide advantages to farmers (against other 
employment categories) and increase their willingness to invest in their vine-yards. 
Third, our ﬁndings indicate that the drivers for participation in the two schemes differ. Financial 
drivers are important for their participation in the Investment Aid Scheme, whereas non-ﬁnancial 
aspects (i.e. idealism) are linked to participating in the Organic Farming Scheme. Also, scheme 
participation was correlated with certain farm types more than others. Our results indicate that different 
types of farmers (or farming systems) prefer different policies. Thus, some farmers would be attracted 
to policy mechanisms that encourage business development while other farmers would sign- up for 
policies that support the protection of the environment.  In this context, it is useful to examine how 
future policies could accommodate this diversity. Our results indicate the necessity for splitting the 
Rural Development Programme into more targeted policies tailored to the varying farmers’ beliefs and 
needs.  
A further conclusion from this study is that the fewer psychological constraints farmers face in 
participating in a scheme, the more they are willing to participate in it as was also found in Läpple 
(2010) and Hansson et al. (2012). Psychological constraints may relate to the social demands of farming 
life, the lifestyle choices in the LFAs and the interactions with the authorities. Policy response to these 
caveats may go beyond the framework of the Rural Development Programme and require a more 
spherical policy approach that encompasses infrastructure improvement, cultural and commercial 
development of rural areas in non-agricultural teams. Finally, the focus of future RD policies could be 
on: modernizing rural life; providing a range of social structure alternatives for rural populations; and 
facilitating farmer’ access to the decision- making centres. This ﬁnding, however, also implies that 
knowledge and information provision is very important. Information could act as a method of reducing 
risk perception and can enable actions at the individual level by changing a person’s attitudes. Further, 
psychological constraints could be overcome through the process of social education in combination 
with the appropriate incentives for scheme participation. 
  
Appendix A. 
 
A. TPB Components 
 Appendix B. 
 
B. Principal Component Analyses 
 
Table B.1 
Factor loading of principal component analysis on vine-growing systems. 
 
Component 
 
Island vineyards    Mountain vineyards    Costal vineyards   Part-time vineyards Estate vineyards   Hobby vineyards 
Cooperative 0.620 
Bulk wine production −0.604 
Training system – cup −0.603 
Muscat grape −0.547 
Private consumption −0.541 
Land formation – terraces −0.525 
Instructions form the buyer of production −0.514 
Age of vineyard 0.456 
Planted on bear land 0.393 
Training system – single cordon 0.305 
Land formation – slope −0.735 
Livestock 0.720 
Debina grape −0.719 
Grassland 0.708 
No other choice −0.57 
Other use 0.377 
Tradition −0.278 
Income security 0.201 
Soultanina grape −0.838 
Grape merchant 0.804 
Irrigation −0.638 
Perennial 0.574 
Olives 0.515 
Main income source −0.458 
Training system – other −0.418 
Land formation – plain −0.417 
VQPRD production 0.415 
Land formation – sight slope 0.585 
Replace an old vineyard −0.576 
Training system – double cordon −0.538 
Foreign grape −0.533 
Use of machinery −0.52 
Table wine production 0.502 
Ask other producers 0.463 
Access from road 0.413 
Hire a consultant 0.390 
Own winery 0. 
Size of vineyard 0.705 
Vineyard rented land 0.697 
Vineyard parcels 0.628 
Decide myself 0.594 
Good income −0.488 
Lifestyle −0.430 
Horticulture 0.622 
Poultry 0.570 
Instruction form suppliers −0.471 
Vineyard already installed −0.356 
Yield 0.283 
Other local grape 0.234 
 
 
 
Appendix C. 
 
C. Selection model 
 
Table C.1 
TPB factor loading for intention to continue. 
Factor   Component loadings   
Idealists con It is important to maintain culture ATT 0.780  
 It is important to remain in area ATT 0.736  
 It is important to protect environment ATT 0.725  
 It is important to maintain landscape ATT 0.702  
 Maintaining vine-growing is a cultural expectation NORM 0.696  
 People consider farmers to be socially lower 
Viticulture is important for my area 
NORM 
ATT −0.519 0.513  
 It is easy to stay in the area CONT 0.496  
Practical con It is important to maintain vineyard ATT  0.617 
 Others expect me to have the best vineyard NORM  0.612 
 I would encourage young people to be vine-growers ATT  0.611 
 Vine-growing can ensure an income ATT  0.564 
 Vine-growing is important to my family NORM  0.534 
 Vine-growing has future potential ATT  0.511 
Control con It is easy for me to stay in vine-growing 
It is easy to secure my future income for vine-growing 
It is easy to have the lifestyle I want being a vine-grower 
It is important to expand my vineyard 
CONT 
CONT 
CONT 
ATT 
  −0.435 
−0.77 
−0.731 
0.614 
 It easy for me to live in a rural environment CONT   −0.591 
 
 
Table C.2 
Description of behavioural factors related to intention to continue vine-growing. 
Estimation results 
Table C.4 
Determinants of farmers’ intention to continue vine-growing. 
 
Factor Description  Explanatory variables Coefﬁcient z Marginal effect z 
Idealists con Farmers concerned about general issues like area,  Age −0.039*** −3.29 −0.007*** −3.64 
environment, cultures and traditions and ﬁnd it easy to stay in Educ 0.122 0.39 0.021 0.36 
their areas Island vineyards −0.156* −1.77 −0.030* −1.89 
Practical con Farmers that ﬁnd viticulture and vine-growing to be important  Mountain vineyards 0.011 0.12 0.013 0.2  for them and their families and need it for income support  Coastal vineyards 0.230** 2.37 0.044** 2.53 Control con Farmers that ﬁnd viticulture important but ﬁnd social and  Part-time vineyards 0.271*** 3.15 0.052*** 3.48 
 practical difﬁculties in practicing it  Estate vineyards 0.039 0.46 0.007 0.44 
   Hobby vineyards 0.228*** 2.89 0.044** 3.13 
   Idealists 0 .168* 1.8 0.033* 1.91 
   Practical 0.092 1.19 0.017 1.21 
   Control −0.046 −0.58 −0.009 −0.67 
   Hou memb 0.203* 1.8 0.039* 1.87 
   sps 0.004 0.01 0.001 0.02 
   Recession −0.942** −2.1 −0.185** −2.24 
   S future −0.191* −0.63 −0.033* −0.58 
   Main occup 0.446 1.21 0.084 1.24    Cons −0.233 −0.21   
   agagh     
   Number of obs 204    
   LR chi2(16) 67.94    
   Prob > chi2 0.0000    
   Pseudo R2 0.3319    
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table C.3 
Descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimation models. 
*   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.1 level of signiﬁcance. 
**   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05 level of signiﬁcance. 
***   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.01 level of signiﬁcance 
 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev 
 
Variables used in the univariate probit on intention to continue 
Island vineyards Island vineyards 5.464 2.007 
Mountain vineyards Mountain vineyards 3.929 1.922 
Coastal vineyards Coastal vineyards 2.561 1.897 
Part-time vineyards Part-time vineyards 3.458 1.841 
Estate vineyards Estate vineyards 2.433 1.720 
Hobby vineyards Hobby vineyards 3.957 1.967 
Age Age of respondent (years) 49.09 13.764 
Educ 1 = college or university, 0 = basic education 0.37 0.485 
S future Situation will improve in future 1 = yes, 0 = no 0.36 0.482 
Recession Impact of recession 1 = negative, 0 = positive 0.84 0.369 
sps Reception of single payment (1 = yes 0 = no) 0.56 0.497 
Hou mem Household members (number) 3.19 1.269 
Main occ Main occupation (1 = farmer, 0 = other) 0.43 0.496 
Idealists TPB factor 1 (normalized from 1 to 10) 6.818 2.022 
Practical TPB factor 2 (normalized from 1 to 10) 6.775 1.817 
Control TPB factor 3 (normalized from 1 to 10) 3.141 1.937 
 
 
Appendix D. 
 
D. Ordered probit models 
 
Table D.1 
Marginal effects of explanatory variables on the outcomes of the standard ordered probit model estimating vine-growers’ intention to participate in the investment aid 
scheme. 
Variable Outcome  
 Deﬁnitely not Probably not Not sure Probably yes Deﬁnitely yes 
Age 0.0014 0.0006 0.0002 −0.0011 −0.0012 
Educ 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0004 
Imp −0.1056*** −0.0485*** −0.0185** 0.0817*** 0.0909*** 
Island vineyards −0.0054 −0.0025 −0.0010 0.0042 0.0047 
Mountain vineyards 0.0034 0.0016 0.0006 −0.0026 −0.0029 
Coastal vineyards 0.0041 0.0019 0.0007 −0.0032 −0.0036 
Part-time vineyards 0.0113 0.0052 0.0020 −0.0087 −0.0097 
Estate vineyards −0.0078 −0.0036 −0.0014 0.0061 0.0067 
Hobby vineyards −0.0001 −0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
Financial imp −0.0456*** −0.0210*** −0.0080*** 0.0353*** 0.0393*** 
Idealists imp −0.0050 −0.0023 −0.0009 0.0039 0.0043 
Control imp −0.0452*** −0.0208*** −0.0079*** 0.0350*** 0.0389*** 
Recession −0.0675* −0.0310* −0.0118 0.0522* 0.0581* 
S future −0.0358 −0.0164 −0.0063 0.0277 0.0308 
Corruption 0.0917*** 0.0421*** 0.0161*** −0.0709*** −0.0789*** 
*   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.1 level of signiﬁcance. 
**   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05 level of signiﬁcance. 
***   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.01 level of signiﬁcance. 
 
 
Table D.2 
Marginal effects of explanatory variables on the outcomes of the selectivity corrected ordered probit model estimating vine-growers’ intention to participate in the subsidy 
scheme for organic farming. 
Variable Outcome  
 Deﬁnitely not Probably not Not sure Probably yes Deﬁnitely yes  
Island vineyards 0.0289* −0.0035 −0.0045* −0.0084* −0.0125*  
Mountain vineyards −0.0441*** 0.0053 0.0069** 0.0129** 0.0190***  Coastal vineyards 0.0476*** −0.0057 −0.0075** −0.0139 −0.0205**  Part-time vineyards −0.0199 0.0024 0.0031 0.0058 0.0086  Estate vineyards −0.0151 0.0018 0.0024 0.0044 0.0065  Hobby vineyards −0.0040 0.0005 0.0006 0.0012 0.0017  Financial org 0.0030 −0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0009 −0.0013  Idealists og −0.0443*** 0.0053 0.0070** 0.0129*** 0.0191***  Control org −0.0578*** 0.0069 0.0091** 0.0169*** 0.0249***  Recession 
S future −0.0322 0.0079 
0.0039 
−0.0009 
0.0051 
−0.0012 
0.0094 
−0.0023 
0.0139 
−0.0034  
Corruption 0.1151* −0.0138 −0.0181 −0.0336 −0.0497* 
Org −0.4564*** 0.0546 0.0717 0.1331 0.1969*** 
Age 0.0036+ −0.0004 −0.0006 −0.0011 −0.0016 
Educ 0.0916 −0.0110 −0.0144 −0.0267 −0.0395 
*   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.1 level of signiﬁcance. 
**   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05 level of signiﬁcance. 
***   Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.01 level of signiﬁcance. 
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